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Recant empirical studies of labor supply have their foundations
in the statistical theory of "index functions." This theory offers a general
methodology to correct for sample selection biases and provides a concep-
tually simple frameworkfar modeling corner solutions to the consumer's
utility vtttie4mizationproblem. In this survey we show how recent studies on
laborsupply dealing withthetopics of labor force participation, fixed
costs of work, and taxes can all be fit within a general "index function
framework."
The statistical theory of index functions has its foundation in the
literature on duy endogenous variables in a system of simultaneous equations.
Thisliterature is based on the notion that discrete endogenous variables
are generated by continuous latent variables crossing thresholds. Tobin's
(1958) seminal paper on estimating the demand for consumer durables is
the first application of index function theory in economics. In Tobin's
model, the intensity of demand for the durable good is the index function.
Due to population variation in reservation prices, many consumers are at
corner solutions. Only if the intensity of demand exceeds some minimum
level(the threshold) does the individual purchase the durable good.
Overthe past decade, the "3.ndex functionframework" has been used
extensivelyto analyze many problems in the area of consumer choice, includ-
ing the analysis of quantal (i.e., discrete) choice (McFadden, 1974, 1976
and Domencich and McFadden, 1976). This framework also forms the basis
for recent work dealing with problems arising from the use of nonrandom
samples and sample selection biases. A general discussion of index functions
and their relationship to simultaneous equation models which incorporate—2—
both continuous and discrete variables appears in Heckman (1978).
This survey begins with a discussion of the basic statistical
framework found inmanyrecent labor supply studies. In Section It we
interpret Recican's (1974a) model of joint labor supply, participation, and
wage rates within this framework. Section III considers extensions of this
model to incorporate fixed costs associated with labor supply, and it inter-
prets the studies of Cogan (1976, 1979), Hanoch (1976, 1979), and Hausman
(1979). Section IV develops a basic model for analyzing progressive tax
schemesandlaborsupply. In Section Vwegeneralize this model to allow
forregressive as well as progressive taxes along the lines proposed by
SunlessandIlausman (1978), Hausinan (1979), and Wales and Woodland (1979).
Discussion of specific methods of estimation is deferred to an appendix.—3—
I.TheBasicIndex Model
The prototype for all of the modelsconsideredin thispaperisa simple
binarychoice 'model. Let V(1) (K1,, '4bethe best attainable utility for a
consumarwho does not work. is unearned income and v isan unobserved
"taste"component. Let V(2) (K2, W, v) be his best attainable utility given
that heworks.His net wage is W and K2ishis unearned incomemeasurednet
of money costsofwork (and other moneytransactions costs). may differ
from R. due to the presence of work—related fixed costs. The net wage is
irrelevant in evaluating the utility of the no work state.
IfV(2) 'V(1))





theconsumer works. This condition, and closely related conditions, underlie
much recent work in labor supply.
-
Ifthe consier works, one maydefine anhours of work equation for
the consumer. If equilibrium hours of work aredetermined by equating
marginal benefits ofwork with marginalcost3,one mayuseRoy's identity
to derive the equation governing hours of workas
3V(2)/V(2) Mt /3K2
Thehours of work equation may be written as—4—
W, v).
In the ensuing analysis, we usethis notationfor the hours of work equation
even when the conditions requiredforthe application of Roy's theorem no
longer apply.
Condition (1) Is a prototype of a class of sample selection conditions
that has received considerable attention in the recent econometric literature.
In order to focusonthe essential statistical issues involved, consider two
linear functions
(2) T1 —Z181 +
(3) +
and£2
are mean zero random variables with finite second moments which are
distributed Independently of the vectors 11 and Z2. Suppose we seek to
estimate 8vHowever,we only have data on individuals In a sample for which
Ti >0.
The regression for Y2 given Z2 and >0is




If and£2are independent, E(c2 c1 >— Z11)—0.Otherwise, the condi-
tional mean of depends on and,Inparticular, on the probability that
an observation withcharacteristics is observed.
Write the joint density of c, £2 as f(c1, c2k) where 6 is a vector of






where F1 is the marginal, distribution function of c1. The conditional density












Aregression of T2 onthat ignores the sanpie selection rule
omitstheteng(.) from theregression and standard speciEication error
argtents appiy.
Forexample, consider a variable that appears in both and 12.
Let be hours of work. A regression of on that does not correct for




The estimated value of differs from the true value 'by the second term on
the right—hand side.
The essential point is that as we change Z2. we alter the effective
composition of the sample of workers. Computed partial derivatives with
respect to combine the cetaris paribus effect of changing Z2. holding
tastes fixed with the effect of changes in Z2. on altering the ple
distribution of tastes for work. The sample distribution of tastes for work
is the distribution of c conditional on condition (1) being met. This final
effectis a consequence of entry and exit of observations from the sample due
to the fact that condition (1) must be satisfied.
Condition (I) encompasses two distinctideas which are sometimes
confused in theliterature. The first idea is that of self—selection. An
individual chooseè either to work or not to work. From an initial random
sample of consumers,a sample of workers is not random in view of condition
(1).The second idea is a more general concept——that of sample selection—
which includes the first idea as a special case. From an "ideal" random
sample, some rule is used to generate an observed sample of individuals
These rules mayormay not be the consequences of choices made
by the consumers being studied. For example, in the negative income tax
experiments,decisions were made to "experiment" on lowincomepopulations.
The effect of this restriction is that a decision rulegeneratesthe observed
samples of workers andnonworkers.Since earnings are generated, in part, by
tastes for work, these restrictions on sample membership operate on labor—7—
supply estimates based on selected samples in much the same way as condition
(1). Econometric solutions to the general sample selection bias problem and
the self—selection bias problem are identical. Much of the modern work on
female labor supply and the analysis of experimental data, to be discussed
below, is designed to eliminate the effects of sample selection bias on
estimated structural labor supply functions.
The index function model given by equationè (2) —(5)underlies all of
the recent work on truncation and sample selection. For example, Cain and
Watts (1973, p. 343) and Hausman and Wise (1977) consider a censoring problem
that arises in analyzing data from the Negative Income Taxexperiments.
Laborsupply functions are fit for experimental participants. However, to
be an experimental participant, earnings, K, are required to be below a
certain cutoff level E.Wethus observe individuals in the experiment only
if K C1.In terms of the index function models, we may write
TI I- K.
Write labor supply as Y2Z2B2 + Weobserveonly if T
Since itisplausible that the disturbances of the earnings function are not
distributedindependently of the disturbances of the hours of work function,
the analysis of equations (2)—(5) applies with full force to this case.
The index function model can readily be generalized to encompass a
multiplicity of samplegenerationrules and a multiplicity of behavioral
functions. andY2maybevectors, and the simultaneous satisfaction of
a set oE sample generation rules can be characterized by the requirement that
lies in some subset of the feasible range of Ti,.—8—
A.version of the index model that will occupy our attention below is
one in which individuals may be in any one of m states of the world where
the value of the random variable determines the state. tn particular,
a consumer is in state i if T lies in a set 0 which is some prespecified
subset of the sample space of The labor supply of a consumer occupying
state i is determined by a function y2H(i) (Rip W., v). Thus, the function
relevant for determining a consumer's hours of work is state dependent in
the sense that its form and/or its arguments differ across the various states.
In the simple binary index model given by equations(1)—(3),there are two
states of the world (i.e., m —2),and the sample space of is divided into two sets:
{Y1 :Y1 c O} and. 02 s :YL
>01.When in state 1 (i.e., ? e°I'
consumer's hours of work is given by Y2 a
H1
=0;and when in state 2 (i.e.,
6 2' Y2 H2 a + £2.
All of the statistical models of labor supply to be considered below are
special cases of this simple index function model. in the Heckian (1974a)
model, there is a "work" and a "no work" state. is the difference between
the market wage and the reservation wage at zero hours of work, if >0,
the consumer works. Given that he works, labor supply is defined as
where y is a substitution parameter. The Cogan (1979) model of
fixed costs is alsQ a two—state model. here is the difference between
hours of work if the consumer is constrained to work and incur fixed costs,
on the one hand, and "reservation hours" of work, on the other hand. If
>0,the consumer chooses to work, and is the hours of work chosen by
the consumer. In the analysis of labor supply under progressive taxes
where the budget constraint is composed of linear segments (due to discrete
jumps in themarginal tax rate),each segment and kink corresponds to a
differentstateof the world. Thus, in—9—
contrast to the Heckman and Cogan models, there is more than one state
associated with "work." is the marginal rate of substitution function,
and as it takes values in various intervals, the consumer's labor supply
equilibrium occurs on different branches of the budget constraint. While
the hours of work function has the sane f on for each of the work. states,
the arguments of the function are appropriately modified to reflect the
different tax parameters facing consumers on the different branches and
kinks of their budget constraints. The Burtless and Hausman (1978) modeL
of labor supply and taxes is general enough to deal with both regressive
and progressive taxes. Their basic framework is the same as the one for
the progressive tax case previously mentioned, except in their model is
an unobserved random "taste" component of the preference function4 As Y1
failsin various regions, equilibrium occurs on different segments of the
budget constraint. The index function models can accomodate a wide variety
of errors in the variables, including errors that arise from the inability
toobserve directlythe particular state of the world a consumer occupies.—10—
II. The Elementary Model of Labor Supply without Fixed Costs and Taxes
Consider a simple model of labor supply that neglects fixed costs of
work and taxes. A consumer faces parametric wage Let K be a Hicks
compositeco=odity of goods andL a Hicks composite coodity of nonmarket
time. Theconsumer's strictlyquasiconcave preference function maybe written
as U(X, L, v) where v is a "tasteshifter."Forthe population of consumers,
thedensityofv is written as f(v). This function induces a distribution on
U.The maximum amount of leisure is T. Income in the absence of work is It.
A consumer works only ifhisbest work alternative is better than his
best nonwork. alternative (i.e., full leisure).In the elementarymodel, a global
comparison between the best attainable utilities in the work and no work
states can be reduced to a local comparison between the marginal value of
leisure at the no work position (the slope of the consumer's highest attainable
indifference curve at zero hours of work) and the wage rate.
The marginal rate of substitution is defined as
T—H, v)
(5) frUIt H v)a
U1(R+WI{,T—R, v)
where H is hours of work and X aR+WH.The reservation wage is frUIt, 0, v).
The consumer works if
(7) M(R,0,)<
otherwise,he does not. If condition (1) is satisfied, the labor supply
function is determined by solving the equation M(R, H, .i) 14for El to obtain-U-
() UaU(R,W, v).
There are three distinct concepts of labor supply or expected hours of
work that are often confused in the literature. Consider a population of
consumerswhoall face offer wage W and receive unearned income B. but who
havedifferentv's. The density f(v) determines the distribution of 11tastes
for work" over the population. One measure of labor supply is the fraction
ofthe populationthat works. Letting 0 denote the set of v such that
M(R,0, v)CW,this fraction is
(9 ) P(W,B.) a ff('v)dv—Prob(M(R,0, v) c w)
where denotes integrating over the set S. The mean hours worked for those
employed is
fH(R,N, v)f(v)dv
(10) E(EIN(R, O v) c w) —
P(W,R)
Yeta third measure of labor supply is the mean hours worked in the entire
population which is given by
(11) EGO af0uca,14,)f(v)dv
(rememberU(R, W, )0for '.' Thethreemeasures of Labor supply
dependon someof the sate parameters, but they are clearly distinct.—12—
There is also some confusion in the literature concerning the appropriate
interpretation of the partial derivatives of these different measures of
laborsupply. Thepartial. derivatives of the hours of work function given by
(8),H. and U, produce the textbook uncompensatedwageand income effects.
It is crucial to note that these derivatives of P(W, B.) with respect to
Wand B. do not correspond to andR(Lewis, 1967; BenPorath,1973).
mustbepositive, andR.need not be. The partial derivatives of (10) or (11)
withrespect to 14' and B.do not correspond to the Hicks—Slutsky terms
orunless condition (7) is satisfied for everyone in the population. These
simple points have be&z ignored in much of the literature. For example, Hall
(1973) and Boskin (1973)interpret the partial derivatives of estimates of
equation(11) with respect to W and R as estimates ofand H respectively.
Others interpret partial derivatives of (10) (estimated from labor supply
functions fit on samples of working individuals) as estimates of the Hicks—
Slutsky parameters. If nonparticipation is a significant phenomenon in the
population being sampled, estimates of (10) or (11) do not generate meaningful
structural labor supply parameters.2
The model of Heckman (1974a) can be written within the index function
framework.Write the marginal rate of substitution function given by (6 )
insezilog form as
(12) LnM(R,H,v) + ÷ a2Z2+ yH +v
where v is a mean zero, normally distributed error term.3 Market wage rates
are written as—13—
(13) LnW—30+5111+V
where V is a normallydistributed error term with meanzero. SolvIng equations(l2
and (13)for hours of work for those obser:ations satisfying Zn W >Zn 1(a, 0,4,
oneobtains
H a1 (ZnW —ZnM(R, 0, ))
(14) -(B0 + 8iZ +V-
Co-
T 2Z2
1o a0+- - 2212) +I(7-
Interms of the two—equation index model,




so that the parameters of the sample selection rule(Y1 >0)are iatnately
related to the labor supply function. Assuming that 'and7 are join:
normally distributed, equations (13) and (14)generalize the 'Tobi:t' nodal
proposedby Tobin (1958). Provided that one variable appears n (12) that
does not appear in (13), y can be by a zaxinum likelihood procecura
or a tao—stage procedure.
We note, parenthetIcally, that in nost data sets on labor supply, the
condition that >0risc also besatisfied in order to obsarie the vaga
rate. Estimates of wage functIonsfiton samples of workers are subject to
thesamesort ofsale selection bias that concaninaces labor supply fun:t:cns—14--
f it on subsanp]ssofworkers (Gronau, 1973). Assuming nora1ly distributed
error components, Heckmau (1974a) builds a model that incorporates an hours
of work equation (14) and a wage equation Qj)thatexplicitly corrects for
the eff act of the condition (Zn S'I >ZnM(R, 0, v)) on generating observations
on workers.-15—
III. Labor Supply Models siithFixedCosts
Cogan (1976, 1979) andHanoch(1976, 1979) extendthesimple model of
the previous section by allowingfora nonconvex choice set arising from
fixedcostsof work such as co=uting costs, expenditures on clothes needed
forwork, etc. Themotivation for introducing fixedcostsis to account
Lorthe small number of observations near zero in the hours of work distri-
butions coputed forworkers. Ourexposition follows more closely the
work of Cogan..
Consider Figure 1. A consumer's no work indifference curve is given by
HA. For the simple model described above, if the wage rate is given by the
slope of RC, the consumer works, and a standard interior solution labor supply
function is generated. If the wage rate is given by the slope of line RB,
the consumer does not work. The introduction of fixed money costs of work
means that the consumer must pay fixed money cost F in order to work. The
breakaven wage, whichcauses the
consumerto be indifferent between work (with the fixed cost) and no work,
is given by the slope of the line connecting points R—F and 0. If the consumer
is given a wage with this slope, and works Hd hours, he is indifferent between
work and nonwork. At any higher wage rate, he will work. As money costs are
thcreasad, so are reservation wage rates and the minisun number of hours that
the consumer works if he works at all. The relevant reservation wage for labor
supply is the slope of indifference curve RA at position D.
The labor supply curve thus has a discontinuity. The consumer either
does not work at all or works at least Ed hours. "Ed" is called "reservation
hours" in the literature. The slope of the no work indifference curve at Rd
hours, is termed the reservation wage. The labor supply function for
those who work is essentially a standard labor supply curve with unearned








The analysis of fixed time costs of work parallels our discussion of
fixed money costs of work except that time costs reduce hours worked by
working individuals while money costs increase hours worked by working
individuals (assuming leisure is a normal good). No new idea is involved.
The most direct way to salve for and Ha is to use the indirect
utility function. is defined as that value of 14 such that
v(a—F, W, 'v)tJ(R,T, v)
i.e., that value of 14d such that given the fixed costs of work, F, the
conster is indifferent between working at wage Wd and not working at all.
This is the procedure used by Cogan (1979).












Since the Rd Wa. and H functions are derived from a common utility function,
cross—equationrestrictions connect these three functions. Without assuming
explicit functional forms for the utility function it is difficult to impose
these restrictions. Cogan does not impose a specific functional f on and so
does not exploit all, the available information in the system. Zn practice,
one does not have data on fixed costs. f is assumed to depend on a large
setof observed variables, some of which do not enter the laborsupply equa-
tionin their own right.
Theconsumer works provided that
H>Rd.




Thus we observe Y2 only when >0.
Using standard sample selection bias correction procedures it is possible
to obtain estimates of the parameters of the H function. Assuming a functional
form for H and H, writing H —
Hain reduced form, and assuming that one
variable appears in H that does not appear inRd (e.g., the wage rate),1 it
is possible to estimate theHd function from the reduced form probability
that the consumer works if the sample at hand contains both workers and nonworkers.
Thus, if
H ZS + Wy +
Ha Z +c2
where Z is a set of exogenous variables, we have H —
Hd
Z(S —) +Wy + —
c,.Assuming that —isnormally distributed, the probability that
H —
Rd
>0is a probit probability. From probit analysis it is possible to
(S-) _________ estimate 1and 1 Combiningthese [Var(c1 —cz)}1 [Var(c1 —c2fl1
estimates with those of 8 and y from the hours of work function, one can
estimate .
Allof the tests for the presence or absence of fixed costs that have been
conducted within the Cogan framework have taken the Heck.n (1974a) specif i—
cation given by equations (13) and (14) as the baseline model of labor supply
without fixed costs. This model assnes a strict proportionality relationship
between the H and the H —Hequations (i.e., between the and the indices).
The simple Heckman specification of the labor supply curve may be drawn as
BB' in Figure 2. The intercept of the function is the log of the reservation—19—
wage.The key point of Cogans analysis is that with fixed money costs of
work, the labor supply function looks like CC'Ct. The log reservation wage
is higher than 3, a working consumer works at least Rd hours, and the labor
supplyfunction is above the Heckman function (because leisure is assumed to
be a normal good). If CC'Ct'isthe true labor supply function, and the linear
Heckmanfunction is fitto the data, labor supply elasticities will be
overstatedbecause theintercept in the linear Heckman labor supply curve
isthereservation wage. Cogan's test for the presence of fixed costsamounts
todetermining whether the curve CC'Ct'explainsthe data significantly better
than the curve BB';if it does,then there are fixed costs associated with
working.
Coga&s test crucially depends on an assumed functional
formforthe labor supply equation given by (14). If one permits nonlinearities
inthelog wage rate variable inthis equation, then a nonlinear curve like 3Din
Figure2 is also consistent with the proportionality assumption (see Recl=an (1974b)
for such ananalysis).For all practical purposes this nonlinearity captures the
essential features of Cogan'sspecification; namely, most consumers work a
largenumber of hours if theywork at all. Fixed costs may make a linear
modelof labor supply into a nonlinear model, but there are many reasons for
nonlinearity. tests for proportionality are more appropriately interpreted
as tests for the presence or absence of nonlinearity in labor supply functions.
Fixed costs are a source of nonlinearities, but evidence for or against
nonlinearity is certainly not evidence for or against fixed costs.
Hausman(1979)extends Cogan's analysis of fixed costs by utilizing cross—
-equationrestrictionson the H and Ed equations,andby utilizing another piece






curve for nonworkers does not depend on fixed costs. Utilizing this informa-
tion, he is able to estimate income and substitution effects of labor supply
usingonly participation data. The price of these achievements is the
imposition of stringent functional forms for preferences and assumptions
about theway unobservablas enter the model.
The utility of the consumerinthe no work position is U(R, T, v).
Using the indirect utility function V(R—F, W, v), Rausmanisable to locate
thebest work alternative. It is possible that the indirect utility function
isnot defined for certain values ofR, F, 1.1 and v, but for such a case, the
consumer does notwork.
Rausman'sspecificationof unobserved heterogeneity v is strong but
leads toeconometrically useful results. Under his assumptions, U, V,and
theirdifference,U —V,are monotonic functions of 'v, a scalar random












a function solely of observed variables) 1-Tausman can divide the domain of v
into two regions: a work region and a no work region. The boundary point for
;he region is given by J*whichsatisfies
V(R—F, W, *) =U(R,T, v*)
Preferences are defined so that for v >vthe consumer works (i.e.,
V(R—P, W, v) >U(R,T, v)), and for v -C.u*the consumer does not work (i.e.,
V(R—F, W, v) <U(R,2', v)).
For each set of parameters (of V and U) and given R, W, and his assumed
function for F, Hausman writes
Yl =V—U,
where corresponds to the index function of equation (2 ).Theprobability
of participation is simply the probability that >0.Given a distribution
of "tastes,t' f(v), the probability of working is
f(v)dv =Prob(Y1
>0).
A corunon set of parameters generate U and V. Hausman is able to estimate
all of the parameters of the functions, and hence can generate all of the
labor supply parameters, including income and substitution parameters, using
only participation data. He is able to extract as much information as Cogan
using less data because he assumes that the same linear labor supply function
applies to the entire preference map, whereas Cogan uses a linear specification—22—
only as anapproximation for the labor supply function for workers. However,
given hours of work data,hisprocedure products no moreinformation than the
Coganprocedure.
Two key assumptions in hausman'smodel not needed in Cogan's, are
(1) fixed costs components are perfectly predicted by measured variables, and
(2) data on wage rates are available for all individuals in the sample
(including nonworkers). -Ifeither of these assumptions is violated, a more
involved procedure is required which amounts to solving for u* given the
unobserved components of F and of W and integrating over both these unobserved
components.While itis conceivable that Rausman'sfirstassumption concerning
theperfect measurability of F is true, hissecond requirementconcerning the
availability of data on offer wages fornonworkersissurelyviolated for
most data sets. We dater discussion of the consequences of not being able
to observe wages for some individuals until Section V, where we develop a
general framework for dealing with such unobservables.—23—
IV. Labor Spp_1yModelswith Progressive Taxes
In this section we extend the simple model of hours of work without
fixed costs outlined in Section II to incorporate progressive taxes. In
contrast to the models of labor supply discussed above where there are two
possible states of the world (Le., work or no work), here we consider a
multistate model. Although this extended model cannot be readily applied
to the regressive tax case, it provides the essential ingredients required
to analyze the general. case.
Provided that the tax function facing the consumer generates a
continuously differentiable strictly convex constraint set, the introduction
of taxes into the model poses few analytical difficulties.1 Define after—tax
income as
K —K(WH+a; p), V>0,K"C0,
where risa vector of parameters of the tax function (including exemption
parameters and the Like). The marginal, wage rate at zero hours of work is
aE'(R;4).
JHaO
Replacing K'(R; *)forSI in condition (7 ),theanalysis of labor force
participation is the same as that given before. If the modified participation
condition is met, one can linearize the budget constraint around the
equilibrium hours of work position and solve for the structural labor supply
equationin terms of the equilibriummarginal wage K' (WU +R; ip)andthe—24—
intercept of thelinearizedbudget constraint at the zero hours of work
position, E(WH+ R; *)— V(WE! + B.; qt)H.Themarginalwage replaces the
gross wage in equation (8 ),andtheinterceptten replaces R in the
equation.
We may write the structural labor supply equation as
H —H(E',E —Vii,ij).
tf labor supply is measured with error, or there are disturbances in the
laborsupply equation, one must instrument the marginal wage and intercept
tens of the linearized budget constraint to achieve consistent estimates.2'3
This analysis tarries over fully to estimation of labor supply functions
in the presence of an equilibrium wage—hours locus (or hedonic line) of the
sort considered by Lewis (1969) and Rosen (1974) provided that theconstraint
setfacing the consumer is continuous andconvex.4
The institutionalfeatures of the U.S. tax system are such that the
assumption of smooth, continuously differentiable constraint sets for after—
taxincomeis counterfactual. The U.S. taxsystem induces kinks and flats
inthe post—tn income function. A progressive tax system generates a convex
budget set with linear segments and kinks such as the one depicted in Figure 3.
Tosimplify the exposition, we consider only a two—flat function. The
ensuinganalysis mayeasilybe extended toa multiple kink constraint. Given
initial income (after tax) of
a2,
anda gross wage rate W,after—tax income
in the presence of a kinked tax schedule maybecharacterized by a marginal
tax rate of tA on the first segment, (0, H), and a higher marginal tax rate





A consumer may occupy any one of four states of the world in this model
of taxes. Each state corresponds to a different kink or segment of the
budget constraint. A consumer who does not work is at kink point a2which
constitutes state 1. A consumer who chooses to work, on the other hand, may
be on segment R2Z, or at kink point 1, or on segment ZN, which constitute
states 2, 3, and 4, respectively. A consumer in state 2 faces a net marginal
wage rate equal. to EW(].—5) andreceives unearned income R. A consumer
in state 4, on the other hand, faces an after—tax wage rate equal to
—






As a consequence of convexity of preferences and the constraint set, a
local comparison of the marginal rate of substitution function given by (6 )
andtheafter—tax wage rate at the kink points determines the location of an




CL?) M(R2, 0, v) E14(1—
tA).
The consumer works in the interval (0, ii)if-
(18) M(R2, 0, ')c andbflR4, R,') >
Theconsumer isincorner solution equilibrium at the kink Z provided that
(19) >M(R,H, v) >
144
14(1 —t3).
Finally,the consumer is at an interior solution in the interval (H, T) if
(20) M(R4, H,. v)<
W4.
Itis straightforward to derive the implied labor supply function
associatedwith each state of the world. To simplify the following exposition
denote thisfunction by (Uforstate i. In state1, the no work state,
obviously R(1)0. Atinteriorequilibrium on branch R1Z, the labor supply
functionis determined by solving the equation M(R2. 11(2)1 v) E 14(1.tA)
for H(2); so, in state 2 hours of work is given by
(21) 11(2)H(R2, v).
In state 3, the corner equilibrium at Z, 11(3)H. Finally, in state
4 (an interior equilibrium along branch ZN), solving MCR,, 11(/) i) 14,
W(l—
t3)for 11(4) implies a labor supply function of the form—27—
(22)
11(4)H(R4, W4, v).
While the functional forofthe labor supply functionsinstates 2 and 4
is the same, the arguments of these functions differ as aconsequence of the
different taxratesfacing consumers on the different branches of the budget
constraint.
To set up this model as an index function model, the "taste shifter"
component,.v, is a natural candidate for the index to determine which
state of the world the consumer occupies. For given values of a1, W, H,
and t.3, the consumer chooses one of the four possible states depending on the
region in which v lies. The conditions relating M(R2, 0, v) and M(R4, H, '4
to after—tax wage rates listed above define these regions. Let
2' 83 and 8 denote the subsets of the sample space of 'v that satisfy
conditions (l7)—(20),respectively.If v &(i.e., v is an element of
the set the consumer chooses state i.
Ifwe assume that themarginal rate of substitution function, M(R, H, v),
ismonotonicaJ.ly increasing in v, we obtain simple expressions for these sets.
Each is a single interval in the real line. Define 4,'4, and as
those values of v satisfying
ER2, 0, W2! W(1 —tA)
(23) t'ftR4, H,
a, — W(1—tB).
Convexity of preferences implies that t4(R4, i,v)'
bf(R2,0, '4.Hencethe
monotonicity assumption implies that < c
\j.Conditions(17) —(20),
then, define the regions as—28—
{'v <\');e= v v <v}; a u< and
04
{vv c 4}.
Choosinga specification for the marginalrateof substitution function
andadistribution for "tastes" in the population, f(v), yields a complete
statistical characterization of labor supply behavior. The probability that
a consiner is in state i is
£24) Prob( ea ff(v)dv.
i
The expected hours of work of a consumer who is known to be in state i is
(25) E(flIv e — E(H(i)Ivee)
1H(i)f(v)dv i —
Prob(v6





Estimation of structural labor supply parameters involves the same set
of issues considered in the simple Eeckman modelexcept that instead of the
single corner and single interior solution segments as in the Heckman model,
there are two corners and two interior segments inthemodel with kinked
progressive taxesconsideredhere. In order toavoidsample selection bias—29—
inestimating structural labor supply functions, one mustaccountfor the
conditioning that generates the observations (i.e., one mustaccountfor the
particularbranch or corner on which anobservation is situated).It is
obvious that,in this case, correctingforpotential sampleselection'bias
automatically corrects for the endogeneity in tax rates and unearned income
levels.Indeed, in this model, endogeneity of taxes andsampleselection
bias come to the same thing.
To illustrate the procedure involved, consider the following empirical
specification. Write }f(R, H, v) as
(27) M(R, H, v) -m0+m1R+m2H+v.
Sinceti is monoton.ically increasingin 'i',theformulas for 4,v,and
givenby (23) provide a simple method for dividing the sample space of 'v into
the sets We obtain
4
a — — m1R4-
m2H
(28) a — m— — m,H—+W(tB —t)
•
vaW2-m0-m1R2sv+m1(R4-R2)+m2H
The probability that the consumer does not work is
(29) Prob('v f(v)d a1—
V3—30—
where F is the cumulative distribution function ofv. Theprobability that
the consumerisat interior equilibrium on the first segment, RZ, is
(30) Prob(1 c <v)Jf(v)dv F(v) -
V2
Theprobability of kink equilibrium at Z is
(31) Prob(4< v <v) f(u)dv aF(s4)
-F(v).
The probability of interior equilibrium along branch ZN is
(32) Prob(v c4)— Jlf(u)d'v
Animportant assumption of this version of the model is thatonecan
directly observe the state of the world each consumer occupies. Knowledge
ofa consumer's hoursof work is all the information required. If H =0,
the consumer is instate ].;i.fflc(0, fi),beisinstate 2; ifHff, he is instate
3; and if H e (H, T), the consumer occupies state 1•Bychoosing a density function
f(V),itis possible to estimate directly the structural parameters deter—
mining the probabilities of each state of the world given by (29) —(32).
If we choose f(v) as the normal density, this statistical model is an
ordered probit scheme (see Johnson (l72) and Rossett—Nelson (1975)). Forming
the sample likelihood, one can estimate all. the parameters of the marginal—31—
rate of substitution function, and the variance of v. (The variance of v,
a2, is estimated by normalizing by the standard deviation withineach
probability statement, and noting that the coefficient on (1 et)wis
1/a.The parameter is identified if the kink point in the after—
tax income function comes at different hours of work for different consumers——
which, plausibly, is the case.)
Since the parameters of the N function generate all of the parameters•
of the labor supply function, the ordered probit analysis suffices to
determinethe parameters ofthe labor supply function without usiqg any data
onhours of work. Given these probabilities, one can compute the conditional
meansof the interior solution of the hours of work function for each branch
ofthe budget constraintand, by following a straightforward generalization
ofequation (5),achieve more efficient estimates of the labor supply
parameters. However, no new parameter is estimated by this procedure. It
isstraightforward to write down thelikelihood function for the full model
andso achieve full efficiency in deriving the estimates.
The labor supply function implied by the linear specification for N
associatedwith equilibrium on segment R2Z is




wherea0——2, a1t_—!,anda2-1-.ForbranchZN, it is
(34) H4 —H(R4,W4, v) —+ ÷
a2W4
—--—32—





a0÷ a1R2 + a2W2+
E[—--i;< vc vJ;
and expected hoursof work of a consumer whoisknowntobe on segment ZN is
(36) E(R(4))v ca+a1R4 + a2W4 + E{—--}v c
Writing [__LN
ccas b2X2 an Z{- 'jv c as b4X4,equation (26)
iixflies that expectS hours of work is
(37) E(H) —(a+ + a2tJ2 + b2A2) (F('v3) —F(v!)J+ (F(vfl) —F(vt))
+o + a1R4 + c2tJ4 + b4A4)F(v)
-R(F(1)-F(u)+ c0(F(v) -P(vV+ F(vt)) + a1[R2(F(v -F(v))+
+ az(W2Fv —F(v!))+ w4F(vpJ + b2A2frv9 —F(1))+ b4X4F(ut).
The empirical spec±fication for hours of work implied by this analysis is
(33) HE(H) + e
whereE(R) is given by (37)and cis a randomly distributed heteroscedastic
errorterm with man zero. This regression equation is estimatedusing a
randomsample of consumers; nonworkers are assigned H —0.—33—
One does not necessarily require complicated nonlinear methods to
estimate the parameters of (37). Assuming that u is normally distributed,
itispossible to estimate each of the F(u) functions by ordered probit analysis.
Thenone can form the product of the estimated F(u) and the wage, tax, and income
variables. Following a straightforward modification of the procedure of
Heckman (1979), one can estimate A2and A, up to a factorof proportionality.
Thenregression of H on these variables will yield estimates of C0,C1, C2,
andthe factors of proportionality on A2 and A4 (b2 and b4).5
Thereis a crucial implicit assumption in the preceding estimation
procedures:hours of work are not measured with error, so measured hours
reflect true or desired hours. If this is not so, data on hours of work do
not suffice to allocate individuals to the correct branch of the budget
constraint. The state of the world a consumer occupies can no longer be
directly observed, and we confront a discrete data version of an errors in
variables problem. If we use data on H to assign individuals to various
states of the world, the ordered probit estimates the wrong flu) functions.
Suppose that true hours of work, U, and measured hours, which we denote by
are related by the ecuation H*H + e where e is a disturbance repre-
senting measurement error which is distributed independently of H and all
the explanatory variables. Then the probability that one observes H in
agiven interval is not the same as the probability that H falls in that
interval.6For example, the probability that H H ispositive, but the
probabilitythat H*H is zero assuming e follows a continuous density
function. Since we estimate the wrong F(u) functions (by using ordered probit
analysis) when assigning consumers to various states on the basis of their
fl*, the variables formed by multiplying estimated F(u) functIons with W,—34—
t3,R2, R4, Fl, and 1. in equation (37) are measuredwitherror which produces
inconsistent parameter estimates.
Thismeasurement error problem only affects the proposed two—stage
estimation technique. It does not lead to any serious complications in the
above theory and empirical. specifications. The expression for S('E given
by (37) is unchanged. Nowhere in its derivation do we require states of




Thisobservation iediately suggestshow to avoid the errors in
variables problem discussed above in the two—stage procedure based on ordered
probit analysis. Instead of using a two—stage procedure of the sort proposed
above to estimate the hours of work function (by first predicting the P() terms
in equation (37) and forming variables using F(',) for the second stage regression),
one should estimate equation (37) directly by nonlinear least squares,
exploiting all of the restrictions of the model, to generate parameter
estimates. The v, \4,v
termscontaln parameters of the marginal rate
ofsubstitution function which are intimately linked with the parameters of
the labor supply equation (see equation (Zs)).7Aswe will see in the next
section,this principle is the technique used by Burtless—Hausman in their
analysis of labor supply and taxes.
Allowingfor measurement error in hours of work causes no
essential changein the general fornui.as describing labor—35—
supply presented above. As previously noted, the formulas fortheprobabilities
of occupying each state are exactly the same. The formula for the uncondi-
tional expected value of measured hours of work is the sane as for true
hoursgiven by (37) except that replaces H. Expected values in this
instanceare computed by integrating H(s) over the setandthe sample
spaceof the measurement error component of hours using the joint density
of u and the measurement error component.
•Two important assumptions maintained in this section are that data on
potential wage rates are available for all individuals including nonworkers
andthat wage rates are exogenous variables. Relaxing these assumptions does
not introduce cnaj or complications inthe previous analysis.
Suppose that true market wage rates are generated by the function
(40) W—W(Q, n)
where Qincludesa consumer's measured characteristics, and n is an error
term representing the contribution of unmeasured characteristics. Conditions
(l7)—(ZO) still determine the state of the world a consumer occupies.
Replacing W by W(Q, ri), we see that, these conditions divide the sample space
of (,ii) intosubsets associated with each state of the world; they define
the sets such that Cv, n) S G implies the consumer is in state i. and
the probability of such an event is
(41) Prob ((v, n) e s) aff®k(v, 'rDdvdri
where k(v, n) is the joint density of v and r, and integration is carried
out over the set G.—36—
The labor supply functions associated with each state are unchanged
except that W(Q, )replacesti in constructing the arguments of the
functions for states 2 and 4 given by (21) and (22). The expression for
expected hours of work given by (26) becomes
4





(43) E(H(1)I(vP )e e1) Prob(v,ri) 6
toillustrate the problems that arise when one introduces a wage
function,consider combining a wage function of the form
(44) W=30+B1Q+n
withthe linear specification of the marginal rate of substitution function
used above to develop the empirical model of labor supply given by (37) and
(38). Even if we assumethatv and n follow a joint normal distribution,
an ordered probit analysis which allocates individuals to different states of
the world no longer applies. While the conditions defining states given by
(l7)—(2a) imply restrictions on linear combinations of v and n,itis not
possible to construct a single linear combination of v and r whosevalue
completely determines which state a consumer occupies.
In particular, define W as E(W) (i.e.,a B0 +B1Q),and R4E(R4).
Replacing ti with W and K4 with 14 in equations (28), we see that—37—
threerandomlydistributed error tens w, and defined by







R4)determine a consumer's state of the world. According to condi-
tions (ii)— (20), a consumer is in state 1 if w>W(l —tA)
— — m1R2Ew*;








m2H in state 3




— — m2HS andin state 4 if
< Wesee then, that the values of three different random variables
(i.e., ui, and$3) determine occupancy of a state. Also, occupancy of
either state 2 or 3 requires the simultaneous satisfaction of two conditions.
Thus, while univariate probit analysis can be used to predict the probability
of state 1 or 4, bivariate probit analysis is needed to specify the probability
of state 2 or 3.
Nodifying the expressions for expected hours Of work to account for the
linear wage function is straightforward using the notation of the previous









+ a1R4 + a2W(1 —t3)
—-Thus,expected hours conditional on
being in state 2 and in state 4 given by (35) and(36)become
• E(H(2)Iw cw and¼ a0+a1R2+a2W(1
—
CA)
+ 4-fw < and¼>C
and
-+a114 + a2(L -t3)+
E[-aI$B<5)—38—
The labor supply functions associated with states 1 and 3 are
unchanged. Given these new expressions for expected hours and the proba-
bilities of occupying each state, one can easily modify expression (37) for
the unconditional expected value of hours of work by making the appropriate
substitutions.
Substituting thisnew expression for E(E) into the regression equation
given by (38) creates an estimating equation for labor supply which allows
wages to be endogenous and which does not require that wage offer .data be
available for all observations. This new specification can beestimated
using the nonlinear least—squares procedure described above. To identify
all the parameters, one nst also estimate the wage equation using data on
workers, adjusting for sample selection bias. This is accomplished by
regressing Won E(Wlconsuzaerworks)— + B1Q+ E(nIw>a*)where E(nlw>
canbecomputed usingtechniquesproposed by Kecletnan (1979).. It is also
possible to estimate hours and wage equationsjointly.
It is significant to note thatrihere represents the contribution of
unobserved variables affecting true wages; it does not include a measure-
ment error component for wages. Allowing for measurenent errors in wages
requires exactly the sae type ofadju.stmentin the formulas for probabili-
ties and expected values as is required in treating measurement errors in
hours. The formuThc for probabilities and expected values given by (41),
-(42), and (43)remainvalid when easurement error in wages is present,
except that expected values are now computed by integrating E(i) timesthe'-39—
joint density function of v, i'j,andthe measurement error components over
the set and the samplespaceof the measurement error components.—40—
V. A General Treatment of TaxesandLabor Supply
This section formulates a model of hours of work that allows for
regressive as well as progressive taxes. Here we develop a methodology to
handle cases where local marginal. comparisons do not fully characterize
labor supply behavior following suggestions by Burtless and Hausman (1978),
Bausman (1979), and Wales and Woodland (1979).
A regressive tax scheme leads to a budget set that is not convex.
Figure 4 displays the case we consider here? A marginal tax rate of CA














A consumer facing this budget set may choose anyoneof three possible
states of the world: the no work position at kink point
K2(i.e., state 1),
or an interior equilibrium on either segment R2S or segment SN (i.e., states
2 and .Aconsumerin state 1.receives initial after—tax income R2. In
state2, a consumerreceives unearned income K2 and works at an after-tax
wagerate equal. to W2W(l—
tA)
whereWisthe gross wage. Finally, a con-
sumer in state 3earnsafter—tax wage rate P!3W(l—
t3)and can be viewed
as receiving the equivalent of K3asunearned income.
The analysis of kinked—nonconvex budget constraints involves an idea
alreadyconsidered. in the analysis of fixed costs: a local comparison
between the reservation wage and the marketwage does not adequately char-
acterize the work—no work decision. Duetothenonconvexityof constraints,
existenceofan interiorsolutionon a branchdoesnot lnplythatequilibtium
willoccuron the branch. ThusinFigure 4,pointBassoicatedwith indiff-
erence mapAA' isa possible interior equilibrium on.branch
R25
thatis
clearlynottheglobal optimum. Since local comparisons of the marginal
ratesof substitution function andafter—tax wagerates cannot be used to
determine the state of theworlda consumer occupies, some features of the
model developed in the previous section no longer apply.
An alternative strategy for deter'-nit'g the portion of the budget
constraint on which a consumer decides to locate is the following. Write
thedirectpreference function asU(X,L, Za,v) wherethe exogenous variable
Zrepresentsthe measured characteristics of a consumer, aisanunknown
vectorofparameters,andvrepresentsthe unmeasured characteristics of a
consumer thataffect preferences.Using well—knownmethods, onemayform
theindirectpreference function V(R, W, Zn. ,'i). Forinterior solutions,




While the arguments of the functions TJ(•), V(-), and E(•) may differ across
consumers, the functional forms are assumed to be the same for each cons timer.
If a consumer is at an interior equilibrium on either segment R2S or
SN, then the equilibrium is defined by a tangency of the indifference curve
and the budget constraint. Since this. tangency indicates a paint of maximum
attainable utility, the indifference curve at this point represents a level
of utility given by V(Ri W, Za, v) where R andare respectively the after—
tax unearned incomeand wagerate aEsociated with segment iThus, hours
of work at such a point must be given by V/V evaluated atand W. br
this point to be an admissible solution, the implied hours of work must lie
betweenthe two endpoints of the interval(i.e.,equilibriummust occur on
thebudget segment). A consumer choosesnot to work ifutility at kink a2,
t,Ia, v), is greater than both V(R2, W2, Za, v) andICR3, Si3, Za,
v),
provided thattheselatter utility values represent solutions located on the
budget constraint.
We have, then, a general technique f or dividing the sample space of the
TttteIlcoiponent uinto the differentregions representing the various states.
Definethe labor supply functions H(1) R(2) and R(3) as R(1) —0and
7.. (a,W,Z,v)
(45)R 7(R W, Za, )R(R,Si1, Za, v), I —2,3;
anddefinethe admissible utility levels V(1)l V(2) and1(3) as (i) a
T,Za, v), assumed to be greater than zero, and—43—







A consumer whose 'v lies in the set
(48) V(1) >V2
andV(1) >(3)1
will not work and occupies state 1. Ifvlies in the set
( (2)>(i)and
(2)> V(3)}P
aconsur is at aninterior solution on segment R2Sandoccupies state 2.
Finally, aconsumer isat equilibrium in state 3 on segment SN if v is an
elementofthe set
(50) 93 a{v:V(3) > and7(3) >
Thesets 0, 9, and e3do not intersect, and their union is the sample
spaceofthus, these sets are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. The
functions K(j) determinethe hours of work of an individual whosev 9e.
Giventhese definitionsof the sets S. and the labor supply functions
the analysis of the previoussection applies with full force. Assuming—44—
f(u) represents the distribution of tastes inthe population, the
formulafor the probability ofa consumer
occupyingstate1. given by (24) and the formnlas for the conditional and
theunconditionalexpected values of labor supply given by (25) and (25)
allremjn valid. Whilethe sets 0. may bedifficult to specify in
analytical form, the general theory and estimation procedures discussed in
theprevious section canbe applied to analyze the models considered in
this section as welt. This includes the theory and the estimation
procedures relating to the introduction of a wage function or arbitrary
forms of measurement error in hours of work and wages.
If wage rates are determined by the function given by (44), where n
ref lects a randomly distributed error term affecting true market wages,
then the definitions
(51) —{(v,ii):v().IV(J)for all J Ji}
replacethe characterization of the sets e given by (48)—(50). A consumer
whose(i,,ru)6 choosesto occupy state i. Given these new
definitionsof 5,, the formulas for probabilities of occupying various
states given by (41), and the formulas for expected valuesof labor supply
given by (42) and (43) all apply without modification. If an errors in the
variables problem exists for hours of work and wages, these formulas still
apply except in computing the appropriate expectedvalues itis also necessary to
include integrationover the measurementerror components of hours and wages.
Burtlessand Rausman(1978),Eiaustnan (1979), and Wales and Woodland
(1979) in their work on labor supply and taxes each use a variant of the—45—
generalframework described above. All of these studies assume that hours
of work. are maasured with error, and none of thent treat wages as endogencus
or measuredwitherror.3
urtlessand Bausman assume a specific utility function that is monotonic in
the unobserved component v, andforwhich ail consumersareguaranteedtowork.
Interms of theabove model,a consumer occupies either state 2 or state 3 (I.e.,
the probability of occupying state 1 is zero). For their preference function,
there exists a critical value v such that at that value, given the wage rate,
tax rate, and intercept income components, the consumer is in equilibrium on
both branches. Working with the indirect utility function, V, v' is defined
such that
(52) V(2) —V(R2,W2, Zcs, v*) —V(R3,W3, ict,
andfor their special functional form a unique solution for .?isguaranteed
toexist. For values of v less than v the consumer is in equilibrium on
branch one. Por values of v greater than t,theconsumer is on branch two.
Thus, tdefinesthe sets and $37andin this instance these sets are
intervals of the real line.
Given their functional form for 7, hours of work equations are defined
byRoy's identity(see equation (45)).In theBurtiess andHausman





Burtless and Hausman estimate the parameters of their model using
maxim likelihood procedures. AJ.lowing for measurement error in hours of
work, they assumthatthis measurement error and v are independently
distributed normal random variables. Their procedure, however, maybe
interpretedas employing the nonlinear least squaresmethod described in
theprevious section. In particular, letting H denote measured hours of
work, the criterion
—
isminimized with respect to the parameters of f(v) and the parameters of
the utility function (which, of course, are also parameters of the labor
supply function). Notice that the value of v changes with values of wages,
taxes, unearned income, a consumer's measured characteristics, and the
parameters of the preference function. Thus must be updated in any
computationalalgorithm that determines the parameters of the model.
Assumingnormallydistributed optimization error, this criterion is also a
maximum likelihood criterion.
Hausman(1979) extends this procedure to allow for corner equilibrium
at zero hours of work. Since we have already discussed the essential
features of Hausman's model in Section III on fixed costs, we will not
repeat that discussion here. Asnoted in that section, there is a serious
problemwith Hausman's analysis concerning his treaent of unobserved wages.
To deal with the problem of missing wage rates for nonworicers, Hausman introduces
a wage function of the sort considered above. He fails, however, to account
properly for the presence of unobserved components of wages when constructing-.47—
thesets whichdefinestates of the world (see formulas (51)).
Hausuianestimates parameters of a wage equation corrected for censoring,
and thentreats thepredicted values from this equation as if they were the
true values of wages. This procedure is equivalent to assuming that the
unobservedcomponents of wages denoted above by ri (see equation (44)) are
identically equal to zero for all individuals inthe sample. Thus, he
definesthesets only over the sample space of v, the random component
reflecting differences in consumer's "tastes." This leads to improper
definitions of these sets if there are any unobserved random components
determtntngwage rates, andthis is true even if v andiiareindependently
distributed.The result is inconsistent estimates of the parameters of the
preferenceand the labor supply functions.
The analyses of Burtless-Hausman and ifausman depend crucially on
particui.ar functiona.l forms for preferences. 'or a general specification
of preferences, and unobserved components, the indirect utility function, V,
need not be monotonic in v, More crucially, we are not guaranteed that a v'
satisfying equation (52) exists, or 11 one does exist, that it is unique;
in this case the sample space of v cannot be simply partitioned into regions
associated with equilibrium along different branches.
Incontrast to the above studies, Wales and Woodland (1979) donot allow
f or unmeasured random differences in consumer1s "tastes." tn particular, the
distributton of 'iisassumed to be degenerate at a single point. Thjs implies
that the direct and the indirect preference functions and the labor supply
functionno longer depend on v;they reduce to tJ(X, I., Za), V(R, W, Zc4 and
H(R,W, Za). Thus, preferences andlaborsupply behavior differ across
-consumersonly to the extent that there are differences in measured charac-
teristics.—48—
Interms of the general framework described above, the Wales—Woodland
model can be interpreted as one in which the probability ofoccupying one
of the states is one and is zero for all other states. In fact,once a
consumer'smeasured characteristics,wage rate, and unearned income are
known,thereis no uncertainty regarding his exactlocationon the budget
constraint.Sincethevariables R, W,and Znexactly determine a consumer's
state of theworld,the expression for theunconditionalexpectation for
hours of work given by (37) becomes
H(1)
if CR,W,Zn)imply state 1
(53) E(H)
11(2)if CR,W, Zn)imply state 2
E(3)
if (B.,W, Zn)imply state 3.
Each H(i) then,isa nonstochastic function of B., W, and Zn that is valid
for only certain combinations of thesevariables. For other combinations,
ECU)shifts to a different R() function associated with the state implied
by the new combinations of observed variables.
TheWales—Woodland estimationprocedure is tochoose the parameters of
the preference function to minimize
-ECU))2
where the suationis over consumers andis measured hours ofwork
(whichneed not be the same as true hours ofwork,10.Bysearching over
potential values of the parameters of the preference function, one chooses
the set of values that minimizes the above least squares criterion. In—49—
computingthe value of thiscriterion(for a given set of parameter values),
the following procedure is used to choose the labor supply function(i.e.,
E(E)) relevant for each consumer.
Given the functional form for preferences, the exogenous variables of
the model (i.e., a consumer's measured characteristics), and values for the
parameters of the preference function, one can compute the utility of the
consumer at each point of the budget constraint—in particular, along each
branch and at each kink point (including the no—work pointR2). By checking
utility on each branch and verifying the existence of an interior solution,
and by checking utility at each kink, one can literally solve the consumer's
ma.mization problem by choosing that labor supply function associated with
the highest utility. For each set of values for the parameters of the
utilityfunction, it is possible to calculate the unique equilibrium
position, either interior or corner, for each consumer. As the parameter
values change, the computed equilibrium hours of work changes.
When taxes are progressive (the only case Wales—Woodland consider),
this procedure boils down to the following algorithm. For each value of a,
one can compute the hours of work implied for each branch using the labor
supply function associated with that branch implied by Roy's Identity.
Thus, for the first branch (i.e., state 2) hours of work are given by
If the predicted H(2) ties in the interval (0, HI, the consumer's equilibrium
position is assumed to lie along the first branch and ECU) is set equal to
Suppose that for the particular value of a under consideration, fl(2) lies
outsidethe interval (0, Th,thenthe equilibrium position is not on the
first branch; so, one checks thesecond branch. For the same a, one can—50—
compute the implied hours of work for this branch, If the 11(3) lies
in the ixitervaJ. (H, TI, the consumer is assumed to be in equilibrium at art
interior point on the second branch, and ER)U(3)• Otherwise he is not.
The same procedure can be used fora problem with more thantwo
branches. From convedty of preferences and constraints, for each a,
equilibrium can occur on only one branch at most.
Suppose that we never predict an H that lies ittthecorrect interval,,
This can happen if there is a corner equilibrium. Each corner should then be
checked including the no—work corner. Evaluate U at each corner. Pick the
corner with the highest utility. This is the equilibrium value, and E(H) is
set equal to that labor supply function associated with the kink. This
procedure is guaranteed to locate the consumer's optimum for each value of a.
This procedure is i=cdest in that itassumes thatgiven a, the
econometriciancansolve the consumer's problem as well as the consumer can.
Thereis no information the consumer has that is relevant to selecting his desired
hours ofwork that the econometrician does not know as well. There are no
omitted variables in the model. Moreover, the model assumes that all
consumers have the same a.
These are strong assumptions. If there are such omitted variables, or
if a differs across consumers, the Wales—Woodland procedure generates
inconsistent parameter estimates because their procedure can allocate
consumers to the wrong branch of the budget constraint. Surprisingly, less
restrictive assumptions that allow for random differences in unmeasured
traits affecting "tastes" may lead to a simpler estimation scheme, such as
the one proposed by 3urtless and Hausman outlined above.—51—
VI.Conclusion
The index function framework forms the basis for
much of the recent work on labor supply. The use of this framework provides
a convenient approach for the estimation of hours of work functions when
budget constraints consist of several segments and kink-s. The methodology
presented in the last section is the most general. It not only admits both
convex and non—convex constraint sets, it also allows for the endogenèity
ofwage rates, for the absence ofwage data for some of the sample obser-
vations, and.for arbitrary forms of easurementerrorin hours of work and
wages.—52—
APPENDIX
ThePerformance of Various Estimators in
the Presence of Sasimle Selection Bias
Woodland and Wales (1978) report some sampling experiments with
alternative estimators for labor supply and wage equations in thepresence
of sample selection bias. The model they consider is a variant of Heckntan
(1974a).
Their hours of work equation is -
ifhO
h 0 otherwise.
Their wage function is
•YPO+ 1121+7222 + e.
Wages are observed only if Ii >0. Intheir sam1ing experiments u and e
are assumed tobe mean zero normally distributedvariables with variances
and respectively and interequationcorrelation of p.
Thefollowing methods are compared:(a) ordinaryleast squares (OLS);
(b)maximtlikelihood; (c) Amiya's estimator (1973); Cd) nonlinear
least souares; Ce) Hec3an's maximum likelihood estimator (1974); (f) Heckmants
twostepestimator(1976,1979). For a complete and thoroughly competent
discussion of these estimators see Wales and Woodland (1978). Table 1 reports
on estimators based on samoles of S000 individuals. The number of workers is
indicatedby M. The trueparametersare given inthe first column. Least
scuaresresults are shown in the second column tobe badly biased. The maximum
likelihoodestimators (method 1 and method 7) generate estimates quite close to the—53—
true values. Amemiya's procedure (method 2) and a one round iterate
of Amemiya (method ZA which is one-Newton step toward the likelihood
optimum from the initial consistent Amemiya estimator) is badly
behaved. A nonlinear least squares procedure (method 3) produces
estimates that are badly biased.
Essentially the same results are found for estimators that use
the entire sample (see Table 2). OLS is badly biased. Maximum likeli-
hood (method 4) generates estimates quite close to the true values.
Two stage methods are less precise in generating parameter estimates.
Correctionsfoi selection bias in the wage equation (results
reported in Table 3)suggestthat the two stage procedures and the
maximualikelihood procedure do about equally well, but maximum likelihood
is still marginally better.
It is important to notethat these samplesare generatedunder
ideal conditions. It would be very interesting to comparethe performance
of these estimators, which are based on the normality asstnption, in
the situation in which the errors are nonnormal. It seems Likely that
the two stage estimators are more robust because the conditional means
of the errors may still closely approximate the true conditional mean
(i.e., the g ten in equation (5 )j. Little is known about the
performance of these estimitors in the presence of other model misspeciii-
cations, but by analogy with the findings in the simultaneous equation
literature it is likely that the to stage estimators are more robust
to misspecification than are the maximum likelihood estimators.—54—
TABLE 1: HOURS EOUAT]ONESTIM4TES BASED ON THE SUD-SAMPLE OF WORCRS










































= 0.5 (H =1531)
o—1.1854 —.073 -1.243 1.691 -.725 -1.436-1.103












221.0 .744 1.057 1.115 .969 1.096 1.016
. (.022) (.037) (.096) (.028) (.027)
1.0393 .853 .997 1.139 .855 1.062 1.011
(.024) (.137) (.016) (.026)
= —0.5 (N =1626)
I—1.1354 .850 -1.071 .237 -.145 -.347-1.225
(.044) (.179) (.659) (.095) (.160)













(.029) (.068) (.1W) (.047)
i.31
(.06)
1.7283 1.127 1.594 1.113 1.230 1.711
(.053) (.W1) (.023) (.057)—55.-
Notesto Table 1
Method 1 estimates are achieved by maximizing the conditional
likelihood function for hours of work.
Method 2 is based on Amemiya's estimator for truncated samples
Anemiya, 1973).
Method2Ais one-Newton—Raohson iterateofthelikelihoodfunction
used in method 1usingtheAmerniyainitial consistent estimator.
Method3 is a nonlinear least squares procedure that jointly
estimatesthe parameters of the regression function and theconditional
meanoftherandom sampledisturbance(for details, see Wales and
Woodland, 1978, who propose this procedure).
Method 7 isHeckman's(l974a) maximum likelihood estimator for
hours and wages conditioned for samplesof workers.This estimator is
proposedbyWflesand Woodland (1978).—56—
TABLE2: N0tJR5uAfl0u ESTItIATES BASED ON TUE ENTIRE SAMPLE













.261 —1.168 -.798,-.799 -.945,-.946 -.782 -.921
(.015) (.053) (.670)
.398 .984 .900, .876 .941, .917 .883 .921
(.010) (.023) (.159)
.329 1.028 .931 .953 .927 .956































































1.6934 1 .72O 1 .269 1.457 1.268 1.456
(.591) (.590)
t 1.7263 .899 1.705
(.Oc)
U
*Whjr estirmta'is derived iroultheothers.Notes to Table 2
Method 4 is Hec]cnan1s (1974a) maximumlikelihoodestimator for
hours and wages.
Method SA is the Hecan(1976,1979) indirect least squares
two—step estimator. The multiplicity of estimates for arises because
this varameter is overidentified in the current model.
Method SB is a CLS version of LA.
MethodSCis the Hecloan procedure asmodified by Wales and
Woodird(1978)orHeclan (1978) to resolve the overidentification
prob1.
Method SD is a GLS version of SC.
is the estimated conditional mean of the disturbance
terminthe hoursof work equation. (This corresponds to gin
equation (5 ).)TABL 3: WAGE EQUATION ESTiMATES
True OLS Method 4 Method LA
p=0





































Th 0 .783 -.006 .055 .052 .091
(.026) (.031) (.089) (.068)
i 1.0 .794 .979 .970 .957
.
.974
(.018) (.013) (.03)) (.029)
1.0 .781 .987 .955 .963 .968
(.018) (.019) .(.032) (.029)




































*Ti.js estirate is derived from the others.—59—
Notes to Table 3
All of the procedures have been defined in Tables 1 and 2.




1For.expositional simplicity, we abstract from endogenous wages in
the statistical analysis presented below. This assumption is not essential
to the analysis.
efining =0for nonworkers-, it is straightforward to verify that
the partial derivative of expected hours with respect to W from equation (11)
exceeds the mean value of B in the population. Defining ER =0for non—
workers, if leisure is a normalgoodthe partial derivative of expected hours
with respect to R is smaller than the mean value of H in the population.
3To simplify notation,we supress Z2 (i.e., a consumer's measured char-
acteristics) as an argument of the functions U(•), M(•) and H(•).
Section III
1Recall that we are assuming that W is exogenous and is available for
each individual in the sample exposition. Cogan (1979) allows for endogenous
wages and his approach does not require wage data for nonworkers.
2Because of the assumptions about functional forms,any set of exogenous
variables, including those that enter the utility function in their own right,
serve to identify the effect of fixed costs on hours of work. Thus, as a
consequence of his functional form, Hausman does not require the exclusion
restriction needed by Cogan to identify the effect of fixed costs on labor
supply.—6 Ga—
Section LV
11n this section, we abstract from thevery important problem that true
taxes are not measured by published tax schedules1 even schedules that care-
fully set out exemptions and deductions. If consumers spend real resources
to avoid paying taxes, such tax avoidance costs are properly considered as
part of the effective tax. With the exception of preliminary work of Gould
(1979), this problem has not received attention in the literature.
1
lnstrumentswill be available provided that variables appearing in the
wage function do not appear in the structural labor supply function. Such
variables are valid instruments.
3The procedure suggested by Hall (1973) and Rosen (1976) that evaluates
the marginal tax rates and intercept terms at a standard number of hours of
work for everyone in the sample, generates inconsistent parameter estimates
because V and E —E'Hare evaluated at the wrong point.
4However, we have no guarantee in this problem that the constraint set
will be so characterized. See Rosen (1974).
5pellechio (1979)proposes estimating a model with kiniced convex
constraints in essentially this fashion.—61—
Section IV (continued)
6Letting g(e) denote the density function ofe, these probabilities are
related by the equation
-








wherethe last line follows from the independence assumption of ii and a.
71t is clear that one need not rigidly chain theparameters of the hours
of work function to the F functions to secure identification. Thus, one
could estimate theparameters ofequation (37) by restricting the parameters
oftheP and X functions to be the same, and not exploiting the theory to
generate the relationship between these parameters anda1, a2,and a3.
However, even though the model is formally identified, it is likely that
parameter estimates obtained by this procedure would be imprecisely estimated.
Exploiting alltherestrictionsof thetheory requires making strong assump-
tionsaboutfunctional form. But if these assumptions are not made, parameter
estimates are likely to be imprecise.
8Notice that the argumentst42, W4, and each depend on W.
Section V
SC,eneralization to more than two branches involves no new principle.
Constraint sets like R2SZ are couon in negative income tax experiments and
in certain social programs.
2Thekink at Sis not treated as a state of the world because there is
not a positive probability that a consumer will be at this point if the
"taste" component v follows a continuous density. In fact, for most
preference functions, point S can never be an equilibriums
3Hausm.an(1979)introduces andestimatesa wage equation, but, as we
discuss later in this section, his estimation procedures do not properly
treat unobserved components of wages.—62—
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